Why euthyphro is prosecuting his father

Euthyphro encourages this suggestion, pointing out that with his expertise in religious matters, Meletus' claims could not stand up long against Socrates in court.

Socrates insists that Euthyphro begin to instruct him regarding what is holy and what is unholy. Socrates has Euthyphro agree with him that there must be one form or standard by which everything holy is holy and everything unholy, by contrast with the holy, is unholy. That is, all holy deeds must be holy by virtue of some feature or other that all holy deeds share in common. Socrates asks Euthyphro what this feature is. Euthyphro suggests that prosecuting those who commit injustices is holy, and not prosecuting them is unholy.

Here, Euthyphro appeals to two Greek myths, noting that Zeus imprisoned his father, Kronos, and that Kronos castrated his father, Uranus. Zeus is the best and most just of all the gods, and so if he behaves rightly in imprisoning his father for injustice, Euthyphro should be lauded for following this example. Socrates : Well then, have we said this also, that the gods, Euthyphro, quarrel and disagree with each other, and that there is enmity between them?

Socrates : But what things is the disagreement about, which causes enmity and anger? Let us look at it in this way. If you and I were to disagree about number, for instance, which of two numbers were the greater, would the disagreement about these matters make us enemies and make us angry with each other, or should we not quickly settle it by resorting to arithmetic? Socrates : Then, too, if we were to disagree about the relative size of things, we should quickly put an end to the disagreement by measuring?

Socrates : And we should, I suppose, come to terms about relative weights by weighing? Socrates : But about what would a disagreement be, which we could not settle and which would cause us to be enemies and be angry with each other?

Perhaps you cannot give an answer offhand; [7d] but let me suggest it. Is it not about right and wrong, and noble and disgraceful, and good and bad? Are not these the questions about which you and I and other people become enemies, when we do become enemies, because we differ about them and cannot reach any satisfactory agreement?

Euthyphro : Yes, Socrates, these are the questions about which we should become enemies. Socrates : And how about the gods, Euthyphro, if they disagree, would they not disagree about these questions?

Socrates : Then, my noble Euthyphro, according to what you say, some of the gods too think some things are right or wrong and noble or disgraceful, and good or bad, and others disagree; for they would not quarrel with each other if they did not disagree about these matters. Is that the case? Socrates : Then the gods in each group love the things which they consider good and right and hate the opposites of these things?

Socrates : But you say that the same things are considered right by some of them and wrong by others; and it is because they disagree about these things [8a] that they quarrel and wage war with each other. Is not this what you said? Socrates : Then, as it seems, the same things are hated and loved by the gods, and the same things would be dear and hateful to the gods.

Socrates : And then the same things would be both holy and unholy, Euthyphro, according to this statement. Socrates : Then you did not answer my question, my friend. For I did not ask you what is at once holy and unholy; but, judging from your reply, what is dear to the gods is also hateful to the gods.

And so, Euthyphro, it would not be surprising if, in punishing your father as you are doing, you were performing an act that is pleasing to Zeus, but hateful to Cronus and Uranus, and pleasing to Hephaestus, but hateful to Hera, and so forth in respect to the other gods, if any disagree with any other about it. Euthyphro : But I think, Socrates, that none of the gods disagrees with any other about this, or holds that he who kills anyone wrongfully ought not to pay the penalty.

Socrates : Well, Euthyphro, to return to men, did you ever hear anybody arguing that he who had killed anyone wrongfully, or had done anything else whatever wrongfully, ought not to pay the penalty? Euthyphro : Why, they are always arguing these points, especially in the law courts. For they do very many wrong things; and then there is nothing they will not do or say, in defending themselves, to avoid the penalty.

Socrates : Yes, but do they acknowledge, Euthyphro, that they have done wrong and, although they acknowledge it, nevertheless say that they ought not to pay the penalty? Socrates : Then there is something they do not do and say. For they do not, I fancy, dare to say and argue that, if they have really done wrong, they ought not to pay the penalty; but, I think, they say they have not done wrong; do they not?

Socrates : Then they do not argue this point, that the wrongdoer must not pay the penalty; but perhaps they argue about this, who is a wrongdoer, and what he did, and when. Socrates : Then is not the same thing true of the gods, if they quarrel about right and wrong, as you say, and some say others have done wrong, and some say they have not? For surely, my friend, no one, either of gods or men, has the face to say that he who does wrong ought not to pay the penalty.

Euthyphro : Yes, you are right about this, Socrates, in the main. Socrates : But I think, Euthyphro, those who dispute, both men and gods, if the gods do dispute, dispute about each separate act. When they differ with one another about any act, some say it was right and others that it was wrong. Is it not so? Socrates : Come now, my dear Euthyphro, inform me, that I may be made wiser, what proof you have that all the gods think that the man lost his life wrongfully, who, when he was a servant, committed murder, was bound by the master of the man he killed, and died as a result of his bonds before the master who had bound him found out from the advisers what he ought to do with him, and that it is right on account of such a man for a son to proceed against his father and accuse him of murder.

Come, try to show me clearly about this, that [9b] the gods surely believe that this conduct is right; and if you show it to my satisfaction, I will glorify your wisdom as long as I live. Euthyphro : But perhaps this is no small task, Socrates; though I could show you quite clearly. Socrates : I understand; it is because you think I am slower to understand than the judges; since it is plain that you will show them that such acts are wrong and that all the gods hate them.

Euthyphro : Quite clearly, Socrates; that is, if they listen to me. Socrates : They will listen, if they find that you are a good speaker. For this act would, as it seems, be hateful to the gods; but we saw just now that holiness and its opposite are not defined in this way; for we saw that what is hateful to the gods is also dear to them; and so I let you off any discussion of this point, Euthyphro. If you like, all the gods may think it wrong and may hate it.

But shall we now emend our definition and say that whatever all the gods hate is unholy and whatever they all love is holy, and what some love and others hate is neither or both? Do you wish this now to be our definition of holiness and unholiness?

Socrates : Nothing, so far as I am concerned, Euthyphro, but consider your own position, whether by adopting this definition you will most easily teach me what you promised.

Euthyphro : Well, I should say that what all the gods love is holy and, on the other hand, what they all hate is unholy. Socrates : Then shall we examine this again, Euthyphro, to see if it is correct, or shall we let it go and accept our own statement, and those of others, agreeing that it is so, if anyone merely says that it is?

Or ought we to inquire into the correctness of the statement? Euthyphro : We ought to inquire. However, I think this is now correct. Socrates : We shall soon know more about this, my friend. Just consider this question:— Is that which is holy loved by the gods because it is holy, or is it holy because it is loved by the gods?

Socrates : Then I will try to speak more clearly. We speak of being carried and of carrying, of being led and of leading, of being seen and of seeing; and you understand—do you not?

Socrates : Then, too, we conceive of a thing being loved and of a thing loving, and the two are different? Euthyphro : Of course.

Now tell me, is a thing which is carried a carried thing because one carries it, or for some other reason? Socrates : And a thing which is led —is it led because one leads it, and a thing which is seen is so because one sees it?

Socrates : Then one does not see it because its a seen thing, but, on the contrary, it is a seen thing because one sees it; and one does not lead it because it is a led thing, but it is a led thing because one leads it; and one does not carry it because it is a carried thing, but it is a carried thing because one carries it. Is it clear, Euthyphro, what I am trying to say?

I am trying to say this, that if anything becomes or undergoes, it does not become because it is in a state of becoming, but it is in a state of becoming because it becomes, and it does not undergo because it is a thing which undergoes, but because it undergoes it is a thing which undergoes; or do you not agree to this?

Socrates : Is not that which is beloved a thing which is either becoming or undergoing something? Try to figure out why Socrates finds this proposal unsatisfactory -ch] Euth. Yes, I should say that what all the gods love is pious and holy, and the opposite which they all hate, impious.

Ought we to enquire into the truth of this, Euthyphro, or simply to accept the mere statement on our own authority and that of others? What do you say? We should enquire; and I believe that the statement will stand the test of enquiry. We shall know better, my good friend, in a little while. The point which I should first wish to understand is whether the pious or holy is beloved by the gods because it is holy, or holy because it is beloved of the gods.

I do not understand your meaning, Socrates. I will endeavour to explain: we, speak of carrying and we speak of being carried, of leading and being led, seeing and being seen. You know that in all such cases there is a difference, and you know also in what the difference lies? I think that I understand.

And is not that which is beloved distinct from that which loves? Well; and now tell me, is that which is carried in this state of carrying because it is carried, or for some other reason? No; that is the reason. And the same is true of what is led and of what is seen? And a thing is not seen because it is visible, but conversely, visible because it is seen; nor is a thing led because it is in the state of being led, or carried because it is in the state of being carried, but the converse of this.

And now I think, Euthyphro, that my meaning will be intelligible; and my meaning is, that any state of action or passion implies previous action or passion. It does not become because it is becoming, but it is in a state of becoming because it becomes; neither does it suffer because it is in a state of suffering, but it is in a state of suffering because it suffers. Do you not agree? Is not that which is loved in some state either of becoming or suffering?

And the same holds as in the previous instances; the state of being loved follows the act of being loved, and not the act the state. And what do you say of piety, Euthyphro: is not piety, according to your definition, loved by all the gods? Because it is pious or holy, or for some other reason? No, that is the reason.

It is loved because it is holy, not holy because it is loved? And that which is dear to the gods is loved by them, and is in a state to be loved of them because it is loved of them? Then that which is dear to the gods, Euthyphro, is not holy, nor is that which is holy loved of God, as you affirm; but they are two different things.

How do you mean, Socrates? Euthyphro remarks that this accusation is probably connected to the divine sign that Socrates claims to be visited by on occasion. Euthyphro, too, is often disbelieved when he speaks about divine matters or predicts the future. He reassures Socrates that one must simply endure these prejudices, and asserts his confidence that Socrates will come out fine in the end.

Socrates inquires as to why Euthyphro has come to court, and Euthyphro answers that he is prosecuting his father for murder which was considered a religious crime by the Greeks. Socrates is amazed that Euthyphro should want to prosecute his own father, remarking that Euthyphro must have very advanced knowledge of these sorts of matters to be making such a bold move.

And, Socrates suggests, his father must have killed another family member: surely, Euthyphro would not go to such pains on behalf of an outsider. Euthyphro replies that he is indeed an expert in these matters, and that, contrary to Socrates' suggestion, the murdered man is not of Euthyphro's family. All that matters in these cases, Euthyphro asserts, is whether or not the killer killed with justification: we should make no exceptions even if the murderer is our father and the murdered man is not close to us.